STRANGE DEFEAT: THE CHILEAN REVOLUTION 1973
In
the spectacular arena of current events recognized as “news,” the
funeral of social-democracy in Chile has been orchestrated as high drama by
those who understand the rise and fall of governments most intuitively: other
specialists of power. The last scenes in the Chilean script have been
written in various political camps in accordance with the requirements of
particular ideologies. Some have come to bury Allende, some to praise him. Still
others claim an ex post facto knowledge of his errors.. Whatever the
sentiments expressed, these obituaries have been written long in advance. The
organizers of “public opinion” can only react reflexively and with a
characteristic distortion of the events themselves.
As
the respective blocs of world opinon “choose sides,” the Chilean tragedy is
reproduced as farce on an international scale; the class struggles in
Chile are dissimulated as a pseudo-conflict between rival ideologies. In the
discussions of ideology nothiing will be heard from those for whom the
“socialism” of the Allende regime was supposedly intended: the Chilean
workers and peasants. Their silence has been ensured not only by those who
machine-gunned them in their factories, fields, and houses, but by those who
claimed (and continue to claim) to represent their “interests.” In spite of
a thousand misrepresentations, however, the forces that were involved in the
“Chilean experiment” have not yet played themselves out. Their real content
will be established only when the forms of their interpretation have been
demystified.
Above
all else, Chile has fascinated the so-called Left in every country. And in
documenting the atrocities of the current junta, each party and sect attempts to
conceal the stupidities of its previous analyses. From the bureaucrats-in-power
of Moscow, Peking, and Havana to the bureaucrats- in-exile of the Trotskyist
movements, a liturgical chorus of leftist pretenders offer their post-mortem
assessments of Chile, with conclusions as predictable as their rhetoric. The
differences between them are only ones of hierarchical nuance; they share a
Leninist terminology which expresses 50 years of counter-revolution throughout
the world.
The
Stalinist parties of the West and the “socialist” states quite rightly view
the defeat of Allende as their defeat: he was one of their own-a man of
State. With the false logic which is an essential mechanism of their power,
those who know so much about State and (the defeat of) Revolution decry the
overthrow of a constitutional, bourgeois regime. For their part, the “left”
impostors of Trotskyism and Maoism can only lament the absence of a “vanguard
party”- the deus ex machina of senile Bolshevism - in Chile. Those who
have inherited the defeat of revolutionary Kronstadt and Shanghai know whereof
they speak: the Leninist project requires the absolute imposition of a deformed
“class consciousness” (the consciousness of a bureaucratic ruling class)
upon those who in their designs are only “the
masses.”
The
dimensions of the “Chilean Revolution” lie outside the constraints of any
particular doctrine. While the "anti-imperialists" of the world
denounce - from a safe distance - the all-too-convenient bogeyman of the CIA,
the real reasons for the defeat of the Chilean proletariat must be sought
elsewhere. Allende the martyr was the same Allende who disarmed the workers’
militias of Santiago and Valparaiso in the weeks before the coup and left them
defenseless before the military whose officers were already in his cabinet. These
actions cannot simply be explained as “class-collaboration” or as a
“sell-out.” The conditions lor the strange defeat of the Unidad Popular were
prepared long in advance. The social contradictions that emerged in the streets
and fields of Chile during August and September were not simply divisions
between “Left” and “Right” but involved a contradiction between the
Chilean proletariat and the politicians of all parties, including those that
posed as the most “revolutionary.” In an “underdeveloped” country, a
highly developed class struggle had arisen which threatened the positions of all
those who wished to maintain underdevelopment whether economically through
continued imperialist domination, or politically through the retardation of an
authentic proletarian power in Chile.
Everywhere,
the expansion of capital creates its apparent opposite in the form of nationalist
movements which seek to appropriate the means of production “on
behalf” of the exploited and thereby appropriate social and political power for
themselves. Imperialism’s extraction of surplus has its political
and social consequences, not only in the enforced poverty of those who
must become its workers, but in the secondary role allotted to the local
bourgeoisie, which is incapable of establishing its complete hegemony over
society. It is precisely this vacuum which the “national liberation”
movements seek to occupy, thereby assuming the managerial role unfulfilled by
the dependent bourgeoisie. This process has taken many forms - from the religious xenophobia of Khadafi to the bureaucratic
religion of Mao - but in each instance, the marching orders of “anti-imperialism”
are the same, and those who give them are in identical positions of command.
The
imperialist distortion of the Chilean economy provided an opening for a
popular movement which aimed at establishing a national capital base.
However, Chile's relatively advanced economic status precluded the kind of bureaucratic
development which has come to power by force of arms in other areas of the
“Third World” (a term which has been used to conceal the real class
divisions in those countries). The fact that the
“progressive” Unidad Popular was able to achieve an electoral
victory as a reformist coalition was a reflection of the peculiar social
structure in Chile, which was in many respects similar to those in advanced
capitalist countries. At the same time, capitalist industrialization created the
conditions for the pos- sible supersession of this bureaucratic alternative in
the form of a rural and urban proletariat which emerged as the most important
class and one with revolutionary aspirations. In Chile, both Christian and
Social Democrats were to prove to be the opponents of any radical solution
to existing problems.
Until
the advent of the UP coalition, the contradictions on the Chilean Left between a
radical base of workers and peasants and its so-called political
“representatives” remained to a large extent latent antagonisms. The
leftist parties were able to organize a popular movement solely on the basis of
the foreign threat posed by American capital. The Communists and Socialists were
able to sustain their image as authentic nationalists under Christian
Democratic rule because Frei’s “Chileanization” program (which included a
policy of agrarian reform that Allende was later to consciously emulate) was
explicitly connected to the American-sponsored “Alliance for Progress.” The
official Left was able to construct its own alliance within Chile in opposing,
not reformism itself, but a reformism with external ties. Even given its
moderate nature, the opposition program of the Chilean Left was only adopted
after the militant strike activity of the 1960’s - organized independently of
the parties - threatened the existence of the Frei regime.
The
succeeding UP was to move into a space opened up by the radical actions of the
Chilean workers and peasants; it imposed itself as an institutionalized
representation of proletarian causes to the extent that it was able to recuperate
them. In spite of the extremely radical nature of many of the earlier strike
actions (which included factory occupations and the workers’ administration of
several industrial plants, most notably at COOT- RALACO), the practice of the
Chilean proletariat lacked a corresponding theoretical or organizational
expression, and this failure to affirm its autonomy left it open to the
manipulations of the politicians. Despite this, the battle between reform and revolution was far from having been
decided.
The
election of the freemason Allende, although it in no way meant that the workers
and peasants had established their own power, nonetheless intensified the class
struggle occurring throughout Chile.Contrary to the UP’s assertions that the
working class had won a major “victory,” both the proletariat and its
enemies were to continue their battle outside conventional parliamentary
channels. Although Allende constantly assured the workers that they were both
engaged in a “common struggle,” he revealed the true nature of his
socialism-by-decree at the beginning of his tenure when he signed the Estatuto,
which formally guaranteed that he would faithfully respect the bourgeois
constitution. Having come to power on the basis of a “radical” program, the
UP was to come into conflict with a growing revolutionary current at its base.
When the Chilean proletariat showed that it was prepared to take the slogans of
the UP program literally - slogans that amounted only to empty rhetoric
and unfulfilled promises on the part of the bureaucratic coalition - and put
them into practice, the contradictions between the content and the form of the
Chilean revolution became apparent. The workers and peasants of Chile were
beginning to speak and act for themselves.
For
all his “Marxism,” Allende was never more than an administrator of state
intervention in a capitalist economy. Allende's etatisme - a form of
state capitalism that has accompanied the rise of all administrators of
underdevelopment - was itself no more than a quantitative extension of Christian
Democratic policies. In nationalizing the copper mines and other industrial
sectors, Allende continued the centralization of the economy under the control
of the Chilean state apparatus - a centralization initiated by the Left’s
“arch-enemy” Frei. Allende, in fact, was forced into nationalizing
certain concerns because they had been spontaneously occupied by their workers.
In forestalling the workers’ self-management of industry by defusing these
occupations, Allende actively opposed the establishment of socialist relations
of production. As a result of his actions, the Chilean workers only exchanged
one set of bosses for another: the government bureaucracy, instead of Kennecott
or Anaconda, directed their alienated labor. This change in appearances could
not conceal the fact that Chilean capitalism was perpetuating itself. From the
profits extracted by multinational corporations to the “five-year plans” of
international Stalinism, the accumulation of capital is an accumulation always
made at the expense of the proletariat.
That
governments and social revolution have nothing in common was demonstrated in
rural areas as well. In contrast to the bureaucratic administration of
“agrarian reform” which was inherited and continued by the Allende regime,
the spontaneous armed seizures of large estates offered a revolutionary answer
to the “land question.” For all the efforts of the CORA (the central
agrarian reform agency) to prevent these expropriations through the mediation of
“peasant cooperatives” (asentamientos), the peasants’ direct action
went beyond such illusory forms of “participation.”
Many of the fundo take-overs
were legitimized by the government only after pressure from the campesinos made
it impossible to do otherwise. Recognizing that such actions called into
question its own authority as well as that of the landowners, the UP
never missed an opportunity to denounce “indiscriminate” expropriations and
to call for a “slow-down.”
The autonomous actions of the rural and urban proletariat formed the
basis for the development of a movement significantly to the left of the Allende
government. At the same time, this movement provided yet another occasion for a
political representation to impose itself on the realities of the Chilean class
struggle. This role was assumed by the Guevarist militants of the MIR and its
rural counterpart, the MCR, both of which succeeded in recuperating many of the
radical achievements of the workers and peasants. The MIRistas’ slogan of
“armed struggle” and their obligatory refusal of electoral politics were
merely pro forma gestures; shortly after the 1970 election, an elite
corps of the ex-urban guerrillas of MIR became Allende’s personally selected
palace guard. The ties that bound the MIR-MCR to the UP went beyond purely
tactical considerations - both had common interests to defend. Despite
MIR’s revolutionary posturing, it acted according to the UP’s bureaucratic
exigencies: whenever the government was in trouble, the adjutants of MIR would
rally its militants around the UP banner. If the MIR failed to be the
“vanguard” of the Chilean proletariat, it was not because it wasn’t enough
of a vanguard, but because its strategy was resisted by those whom it tried
to manipulate.
Right-wing
activity in Chile increased, not in response to any governmental decrees, but
because of the direct threat posed by the independence of the proletariat. In
the face of mounting economic difficulties, the UP could only talk of
“rightist sabotage” and the obstinacy of a “workers’ aristocracy.” For
all the impotent denunciations of the government, these “difficulties” were social
problems that could only be solved in a radical way through the
establishment of a revolutionary power in Chile. In spite of its claims to
“defend the rights of the workers,” the Allende government proved to be an
impotent bystander in the class struggle unfolding outside of formal political
structures. It was the workers and peasants themselves who took the initiative
against the reaction and in so doing created new and radical forms of social
organization, forms which expressed a highly-developed class consciousness.
After the bosses’ strike in October 1972, the workers did not wait for the UP
to intervene, but actively occupied the factories and started up production on
their own, without state or trade union –“assistance.” Cordones
industriales, which controlled and coordinated the distribution of products
and organized armed defense against the employers, were formed in the factory
complexes. Unlike the “popular assemblies” promised by the UP, which only
existed on paper, the cordones were set up by the workers themselves. In
their structure and functioning, these committees -along with the rural consejos
- were the first manifestations of a councilist tendency and as such
constituted the most important contribution to the development of a
revolutionary situation in Chile.
A
similar situation existed in the neighborhoods, where the inefficient,
government-controlled “supply boards” (JAP’s) were bypassed in the
proclamations of “self-governing neighborhoods” and the organization of comandos
comunales by the residents. Despite their infiltration by the fidelistas of
MIR, these armed expropriations of social space formed the point of departure
for an authentic proletarian power. For the first time, people who had
previously been excluded from participation in social life were able to make
decisions concerning the most basic realities of their daily lives. The men,
women, and youth of the poblaciones discovered that revolution was not a
matter for the ballot box; whatever the quarters were called - New Havana,
Heroic Vietnam - what went on inside them had nothing to do with the alienated
landscapes of their namesakes.
Although
the achievements that were realized by popular initiative were considerable, a
third force capable of posing a revolutionary alternative to the government and
the reactionaries never fully emerged. The workers and peasants failed to extend
their conquests to the point of replacing the Allende regime with their own
power. Their supposed “ally,” the MIR, used its talk of opposing burocratismo
with the “armed masses” as a mask for its own intrigues. In its Leninist
scheme, the cordones were seen as “forms of struggle” that would
prepare the way for future, less “restricted” organizational models, whose
leadership would be supplied by the MIR, no doubt.
For all its concern over the right-wing plots that menaced its existence,
the government restrained the workers from taking positive action to resolve the
class struggle in Chile. In so doing the initiative passed from
workers’ hands into the government's, and in allowing. itself to be
out-maneuvered, the Chilean proletariat paved the way for its future defeat. In
response to Allende’s pleas after the abortive coup of June 29, the workers
occupied additional factories, only to close ranks behind the forces that would
disarm them a month later. These occupations remained defined by the UP and its
intermediaries in the national trade union, the CUT, who kept the workers
isolated from each other by barricading them inside the factories. In such a
situation, the proletariat was powerless to carry on any independent struggle,
and once the Weapons Act had been signed, its fate was sealed. Like the Spanish
Republicans who denied arms to the anarchist militias on the Aragon front,
Allende was not prepared to tolerate the existence of an armed proletarian force
outside his own regime. All the conspiracies of the Right would not have lasted
a day if the Chilean workers and peasants had been armed and had organized their
own militias. Although the MIR protested against the entry of the military into
the government, they, like their predecessors in Uruguay, the Tupamaros, only talked
of arming the workers and had little to do with the resistance that took
place. The workers’ slogan, “A disarmed people is a defeated people” was
to find its bitter truth in the slaughter of workers and peasants that followed
the military coup.
Allende
was overthrown, not because of his reforms, but because he was unable to control
the revolutionary movement which spontaneously developed at the base of the UP.
The junta which installed itself in his position clearly perceived the threat of
revolution and set about eliminating it with all the means at its disposal. It
was no accident that the strongest resistance to the dictatorship occurred in
those areas where the power of the workers had advanced the furthest. In the
Sumar Textile Plant and in Concepcion, for instance, the junta was forced to
liquidate this power by means of air strikes. As a result of Allende's policies,
the military was able to have a free hand in finishing what it had already begun
under the UP government: Allende was as responsible as Pinochet for the mass
murders of workers and peasants in Santiago, Valparaiso, Antofagasta and the
provinces. Perhaps the most revealing of all the ironies inherent in the UP’s
downfall is that while many of Allende’s supporters did not survive the coup,
many of his reforms did. So little meaning was left to political categories that
the junta’s new Foreign Minister could describe himself as a
“socialist.”
Radical
movements are underdeveloped to the extent that they respect alienation and
surrender their power to external forces instead of creating it for themselves.
In Chile, the revolutionaries hastened the day of their own Thermidor by letting
“representatives” speak and act on their behalf: although parliamentary
authority had been effectively replaced by the cordones, the workers did
not go beyond these conditions of dual power and abolish the bourgeois State and
the parties that maintained it. If the future struggles in Chile are to advance,
the enemies within the workers’ movement must be overcome practically; the
councilist tendencies in the factories, neighborhoods, and fields will be everything
or nothing. All the vanguard parties that will continue to pass
themselves off as the “workers’ leadership” - whether they be the MIR, a
clandestine CP, or any other underground splinter groups - can only repeat the
betrayals of the past. Ideological imperialism must be confronted as radically
as economic imperialism has been expropriated; the workers and peasants can
depend only on themselves to advance beyond what the cordones industriales have
al- ready accomplished.
Comparisons
between the Chilean experience and the 1936 Spanish Revolution are already being
made, and not only here - one finds strange words coming from Trotskyists in
praise of workers’ militias which fought against all forms of hierarchy. While
it is true that a radical third force did emerge in Chile, it did so only
tentatively. Unlike the Spanish proletariat, the Chilean revolutionaries never
created an entirely new kind of society on the basis of councilist organization,
and the Chilean Revolution will only succeed if these forms (cordones,
comandos) are capable of establishing their social hegemony. The obstacles
to their development are similar to those that were confronted in Spain: the
Spanish councils and militias faced two enemies in the form of Fascism and the
Republican government, while the Chilean workers face international capitalism
and the manipulators of social-democracy and Leninism.
From
the favellas of Brazil to the labor camps of Cuba, the proletariat is
nowhere in power in Latin America or anywhere else, and this powerlessness
constantly impels it to new actions. The Chilean workers are not alone in their
opposition to the forces of counter-revolution; the revolutionary movement that
began in Mexico with Villa’s guerrilla bands has not yet come to an end. In
the armed workers’ militias that fought in the streets of Santo Domingo in
1965, the urban insurrection in Cordoba, Argentina in 1969, and the recent
strikes and occupations in Bolivia and Uruguay, the spontaneous revolt of
workers and students in Trinidad in 1970, and the continuing revolutionary
crisis in the Caribbean, the proletariat of Latin America has maintained a
continual offensive against all those who seek to maintain present conditions.
In its
struggle, the proletariat is faced with various caricatures of revolution
which masquerade as its allies. These travesties have in turn encountered a
false movement of so-called “ultra-left” opposition. Thus, the ex- fascist
Peron prepares to construct a corporate state in Argentina, this time in a
leftist guise, while the Trotskyist commandos of the ERP denounce him for not
being “revolutionary” enough, and the ex-guerrillero Castro berates
all those who fail to meet the standards of “communist” discipline. History
will not fail to dissolve the power of these idiots.
A
conspiracy of tradition - with agents on both the Left and Right - ensures that
existing reality is always presented in terms of false alternatives. The
only choices acceptable to Power are those between competing hierarchies: the
colonels of Peru or the generals of Brazil, the armies of the Arab states or
those of Israel. These antagonisms only express divisions within global
capitalism, and any genuinely revolutionary alternative will have to establish
itself over the ruins of these spectacular conflicts. The combined lies of
bourgeois and bureaucratic power must be confronted by a revolutionary truth in
arms, all over the world as in Chile. There can be no “socialism in one
country,” or in one factory or district. Revolution is an international task
which can only be solved on an international level - it does not recognize
continental frontiers. Like any revolution, the Chilean Revolution requires the
success of similar movements in other areas. Everywhere, in the wildcat strikes
in the United States and West Germany, the factory occupations in France, and in
civil insurrections in the USSR, the foundations for a new world are being laid.
Those who recognize themselves in this global movement must seize the
opportunity to extend it with all the subversive weapons at their
disposal.
Point Blank:
Berkeley, California, USA. October 1973.
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